Introduction to Problem Banks eBook
Introduction to Problem Banks
February 25-27, 2025 Live Virtual
@ www.csbs.org ♦ @csbsnews
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS 1300 I Street NW / Suite 700 / Washington, DC 20005 / (202) 296-2840
Introduction to Problem Banks Live Virtual February 25-27, 2025
Tuesday, February 25 1:00 pm – 1:30 pm
Welcome & Introductions
Defining Problem Banks and History Perspectives
1:30 pm – 2:00 pm
2:00 pm – 2:15 pm
Break
Red Flags
2:15 pm – 3:00 pm
Case Study: Pre-Exam Planning Memo
3:00 pm – 4:00 pm
Wednesday, February 26 1:00 pm – 1:30 pm
Case Study Discussion: Pre-Exam Planning Memo
Exam Plan and Process
1:30 pm – 2:00 pm
2:00 pm – 2:15 pm
Break
Exam Plan and Process
2:15 pm – 3:00 pm
Case Study: Exam Results Memo
3:00 pm – 4:00 pm
Thursday, February 27 1:00 pm – 1:30 pm
Case Study Discussion & Wrap-Up
Enforcement Actions
1:30 pm – 2:15 pm
2:15 pm – 2:30 pm
Break
Enforcement Actions
2:30 pm – 3:00 pm
Introduction to Bank Closures
3:00 pm – 3:30 pm
Q&A / Wrap-Up
3:30 pm – 4:00 pm
February 25-27, 2025 Introduction to Problem Banks Live Virtual
ATTENDEES Arkansas State Bank Department Thompson, Abigale
athompson@banking.state.ar.us cwilson@banking.state.ar.us
Wilson, Christopher
California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation Lo, Isabel
isabel.lo@dfpi.ca.gov logan.serface@dfpi.ca.gov
Serface, Logan
Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies Division of Banking Thompson, Rachael
rachael.thompson@state.co.us
Winkel, Troy
troy.winkel@state.co.us
Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs - Financial Institutions Kobuke, Irene
imkobuke@dcca.hawaii.gov
Maine Bureau of Financial Institutions Getchell, Sean
sean.getchell@maine.gov lindsey.mattson@maine.gov andrea.mclaughlin@maine.gov
Mattson, LIndsey McLaughlin, Andrea
Massachusetts Division of Banks Bracchi, Russell
russell.bracchi@mass.gov
Mississippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance Craig, James
james.craig@dbcf.ms.gov
New York State Department of Financial Services Khan, Tariq
tariq.khan@dfs.ny.gov daisy.le@dfs.ny.gov
Le, Daisy
Leganczuk, Jeremy McLeod, Nia Mehta, Deepali Steans, Jessica Weintraub, David
jeremy.leganczuk@dfs.ny.gov nia.mcleod@dfs.ny.gov deepali.mehta@dfs.ny.gov jessica.steans@dfs.ny.gov david.weintraub@dfs.ny.gov
Oklahoma Banking Department Duncan, Clint
clint.duncan@banking.ok.gov
Oregon Division of Financial Regulation Riggs, Kassia Utah Department of Financial Institutions Anderson, Ryan
kassia.riggs@dcbs.oregon.gov
ryananderson@utah.gov scottbarlow@utah.gov abateman@utah.gov marthahernandez@utah.gov
Barlow, Scott
Bateman, Amber Hernandez, Martha
Maeda, Tomo Nunez, Daniel
tjmaeda@utah.gov dnunez@utah.gov
INSTRUCTORS Arkansas State Bank Department Moseley, Baker
bmoseley@banking.state.ar.us
California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation Nahnsen-Robison, Catherine
catherine.nahnsen-robison@dfpi.ca.gov
Georgia Department of Banking and Finance Ensminger, Heather
hensminger@dbf.state.ga.us
Iowa Division of Banking Irlbeck, Zachery
zachery.irlbeck@idob.state.ia.us
CSBS STAFF Hoyle, Katie
khoyle@csbs.org
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Introduction to Problem Banks Training February 25-27, 2025
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Zoom Features
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Schedule • February 25: 1:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET
• February 26: 1:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET
• February 27: 1:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET
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Attendance Policy In order to receive a certificate of completion for a CSBS virtual training, an attendee may not miss more than 1 hour throughout the duration of the training. Attendees must also participate in all training activities including exercises, presentations, and assessments to receive the credit hours (CEHs) and certificate. If a certificate of completion is not important to you, you may continue in the training even if you no longer meet the attendance requirement.
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Instructor Contact Information
Business Analysis Director Georgia Department of Banking and Finance hensminger@dbf.state.ga.us Heather Ensminger
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Instructor Contact Information
Senior Bank Examiner Iowa Division of Banking zachery.irlbeck@idob.state.ia.us Zachery Irlbeck
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Instructor Contact Information
Assistant Deputy Commissioner Arkansas State Bank Department bmoseley@banking.state.ar.us Baker Moseley
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Instructor Contact Information
Regional Deputy Commissioner, Banking California Department of Financial Protection & Innovation catherine.nahnsen-robison@dfpi.ca.gov Cathy Nahnsen-Robison
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Pre-Course Questionnaire Discussion
www.menti.com Code: 9756 5267
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Introductions
NAME
AGENCY/STATE
HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN AN EXAMINER?
ANSWER ONE CASE STUDY QUESTION
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Prior Exam Case Study 1. Based on the current examination findings, what are the major areas you would like to focus on as EIC? • Name one of the major areas 2. You are conducting an off-site review of State Bank of Anytown, what ratios, numbers, and/or information would you review to determine if any material changes have occurred since the previous examination? Why? • Name one ratio, numbers, or information 3. What type of risk indicators would have to be present to start the exam sooner than scheduled? • Name one risk indicator
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Defining Problem Banks and History Perspectives When good banks go bad…
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January 16, 2025 Pulaski Savings Bank fails, Millennium Bank assumes deposits Pulaski Savings Bank, a $49.5 million asset Chicago-based community bank, was shut down Friday by the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. was appointed as the receiver and all the banks' $42.7 million in deposits were assumed by nearby Millennium Bank of Des Plaines, Illinois. "Millennium Bank agreed to assume all deposits at the time of closing for a 4.61 percent premium. It will also purchase approximately $45.0 million of the failed bank's assets," an agency release noted. "The FDIC will retain the remaining assets for later disposition." "The FDIC preliminarily estimates that the failure will cost its Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) about $28.5 million," the FDIC said in a release. "The estimate will change over time as assets are sold. Suspected fraud caused the higher estimated cost to the DIF."
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October 18, 2024 Oklahoma bank fails amid claims of 'false and deceptive bank records’ On Friday, Oct. 18, the First National Bank of Lindsay in south central Oklahoma, was reported closed by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Comptroller of the Currency over “false and deceptive” bank records. A member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), First National was the first bank since April 26 to be shut down by federal regulators. Two days later, it reopened as First Bank and Trust Co., based in Duncan, Oklahoma. The agency projects that the failure will cost the DIF $43 million.
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October 18, 2024 Republic First becomes the first FDIC-insured bank failure of 2024 The news: Last Friday, Pennsylvania financial regulators seized and shut down Philadelphia-based Republic First Bank in the first FDIC-insured bank failure of 2024. • The deposit insurance fund is expected to pay out $667 million to cover the bank’s failure.
Full article: https://www.emarketer.com/content/republic-first-becomes-first fdic-insured-bank-failure-of-2024
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November 3, 2023 Iowa community bank becomes 5th to fail this year The $66 million-asset Citizens Bank of Sac City, Iowa, entered receivership of the FDIC on Friday and was then acquired by Iowa Trust & Savings. Citizens Bank of Sac City, Iowa, failed Friday after examiners “identified significant loan losses that had not previously been identified by the bank,” the Iowa Division of Banking announced.
Full article: https://www.bankingdive.com/news/citizens-sac-city-iowa community-bank-fifth-2023-failure/699034/
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July 28, 2023 ‘ Huge scam’ in rural Kansas town fells fourth U.S. bank in 2023 On Friday, July 28, 2023, Heartland Tri-State Bank was closed by the Kansas Office of the State Bank Commissioner. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was subsequently named Receiver. No advance notice is given to the public when a financial institution is closed. Dream First Bank, National Association (N.A.), Syracuse, KS assumed all deposit accounts and substantially all the assets. All shares of stock were owned by the holding company, which was not involved in this transaction. "Heartland Tri-State Bank failed because of alleged fraudulent activity conducted by the bank's chief executive officer (CEO), who initiated a series of wire transfers totaling about $47.1 million Heartland's funds, among other suspicious activities, as part of an apparent cryptocurrency scheme referred to as 'pig butchering,’” the report said.
Full article: https://kansasreflector.com/2023/08/11/huge-scam-in-rural-kansas-town-fells-fourth-u-s-bank in-2023/
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March 10, 2023 Regulators shut down Silicon Valley Bank, capping abrupt 44-hour collapse The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation took possession of the struggling bank, whose stock price tanked 60% the day before, and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as the bank's receiver. It cited inadequate liquidity and insolvency… The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank was the first bank failure in nearly two and a half years. The last FDIC-insured institution to fail was the $70 million asset Almena State Bank in Kansas on Oct 23, 2020, according to the FDIC website, its estimated cost to the DIF was $16.8 million.
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October 23, 2020 Kansas regulators close Almena State Bank in year’s 4th bank failure The FDIC blamed Almena’s closure on “longstanding capital and asset quality issues” unrelated to the coronavirus pandemic. The bank had lost more than $9.3 million since 2018 and had not turned an annual profit since 2017,American Banker reported. The FDIC estimates the bank failure will cost the Deposit Insurance Fund $18.3 million.
Full article: https://www.bankingdive.com/news/almena-state-bank-failure closure/587716/
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Additional Articles: 1. Collateral Damage: The Death of a Small Town Bank – Time 2. A bank failure shattered trust in this Kansas town. Only honest talk will heal it. – Kansas Reflector 3. Ex-Heartland Tri-State CEO charged with embezzling $47M in crypto – Banking Dive
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What is a problem bank? In the chat, type some characteristics of what makes a bank a problem bank.
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Definition:
A financial institution with a composite rating of 3, 4, or 5
A financial institution under an enforcement action
Not to be confused with “Troubled Bank”
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Two Scenarios
Known Problem Bank
Surprise/ Non-Known Problem Bank
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What’s the difference?
1. How would you prep for each scenario?
2. How would the examination change once you got there?
Type in chat or raise your hand to answer
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Today’s Landscape: In the chat, describe what you see as either present or looming risks?
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What we plan to cover in this course:
1. Red Flags 2. Examination Techniques 3. Enforcement Actions
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Brief History of Crisis and Response
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The Great Depression • The Banking Act of 1933 • The Security and Exchange Act of 1934 • The Banking Act of 1935
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• Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 • Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 • Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) • Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991
The 1980s
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9/11/2001 USA PATRIOT ACT significantly increased regulators responsibilities to ensure that financial institutions implement systems to comply with The Bank Secrecy Act.
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The Great Recession – December 2007
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The Pandemic Effect and Beyond
Liquidity
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Pulaski Savings Bank fails, Millennium Bank assumes deposits The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency closed the First National Bank of Lindsay due to what the regulator said were false and deceptive bank records suggesting fraud, which depleted the bank's capital reserves. "The FDIC preliminarily estimates that the failure will cost its Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) about $28.5 million," the FDIC said in a release. "The estimate will change over time as assets are sold. Suspected fraud caused the higher estimated cost to the DIF.“
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What’s coming next?
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Questions
1/21/25, 10:46 AM
View Content - Meltwater
Pulaski Savings Bank fails, Millennium Bank assumes deposits
American Banker Online - Powered by Dow Jones | January 16, 2025
Pulaski Savings Bank, a $49.5 million asset Chicago-based community bank, was shut down Friday by the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. was appointed as the receiver and all the banks' $42.7 million in deposits were assumed by nearby Millennium Bank of Des Plaines, Illinois. "Millennium Bank agreed to assume all deposits at the time of closing for a 4.61 percent premium. It will also purchase approximately $45.0 million of the failed bank's assets," an agency release noted. "The FDIC will retain the remaining assets for later disposition."
Pulaski Savings Bank — which has one location — will reopen as a branch of Millennium Bank on Saturday during regular business hours.
Depositors of the failed bank will automatically become depositors of Millennium Bank and don't have to take any action to have access to their accounts, according to the FDIC.
The closure of Pulaski Savings Bank and the transfer of its deposits to Millennium Bank mark the first bank failure of 2025 .
Before Friday's failure, First National Bank of Lindsay, in Lindsay, Okla. in October 2024 was the last time the agency wound down an FDIC-insured bank.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency closed the First National Bank of Lindsay due to what the regulator said were false and deceptive bank records suggesting fraud, which depleted the bank's capital reserves.
While First National's failure was estimated to cost the DIF $43 million, the agency predicted Pulaski's failure will cost slightly less.
"The FDIC preliminarily estimates that the failure will cost its Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) about $28.5 million," the FDIC said in a release. "The estimate will change over time as assets are sold. Suspected fraud caused the higher estimated cost to the DIF."
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10/21/24, 8:55 AM
Oklahoma bank fails amid claims of 'false and deceptive bank records' | American Banker
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POLITICS AND POLICY
Oklahoma bank fails amid claims of 'false and deceptive bank records'
By Claire Williams
October 18, 2024, 8:26 p.m. EDT 2 Min Read
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. sold the insured deposits of a failed small bank in Oklahoma to another local community bank on Friday. Al Drago/Bloomberg
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/oklahoma-bank-fails-amid-claims-of-false-and-deceptive-bank-records?utm_campaign=NL_AB_Daily_Briefing… 1/8
10/21/24, 8:55 AM
Oklahoma bank fails amid claims of 'false and deceptive bank records' | American Banker
WASHINGTON — The First National Bank of Lindsay in Lindsay, Okla., was shuttered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. on Friday.
First Bank & Trust Co. in Duncan, Okla., assumed the First National Bank of Lindsay's insured deposits. The only office of the First National Bank of Lindsay will resume normal business hours as a branch of First Bank & Trust Co. on Monday.
The OCC closed the bank "after identifying false and deceptive bank records and other information suggesting fraud that revealed depletion of the bank's capital," the agency said in a press release.
"The OCC also found that the bank was in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business and that the bank's assets were less than its obligations to its creditors and others," the regulator said.
The OCC is also referring the issue to the Department of Justice, "which has a wide variety of tools to hold individuals accountable for criminal acts and focuses on victims in all of its matters."
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The agency provided no further details.
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/oklahoma-bank-fails-amid-claims-of-false-and-deceptive-bank-records?utm_campaign=NL_AB_Daily_Briefing… 2/8
10/21/24, 8:55 AM
Oklahoma bank fails amid claims of 'false and deceptive bank records' | American Banker
"The OCC does not comment on bank closings beyond what is available on our website," Stephanie Collins, a spokesperson for the OCC, said in a statement.
The FDIC will make 50% of uninsured funds available to depositors on Monday, the FDIC said. That amount could increase as the FDIC sells the remaining assets of the bank.
The failure is an outsized hit, compared to the size of the bank, to the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund — the pot of money that banks pay into to resolve failed banks. The agency projects that the failure will cost the DIF $43 million, although that estimate could change over time as assets are sold, the FDIC said.
The First National Bank of Lindsay previously reported assets of $107.8 million. Deposits totaled $97.5 million, and around $7.1 million of those deposits exceeded FDIC insurance limits, the agency said.
That amount could change as the agency receives additional information from customers, the FDIC said.
First Bank & Trust Co. has assumed the failed bank's insured deposits for a 6.67% premium and will buy about $20 million of its assets.
The potential hit to the DIF comes at a sensitive time for the FDIC.
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/oklahoma-bank-fails-amid-claims-of-false-and-deceptive-bank-records?utm_campaign=NL_AB_Daily_Briefing… 3/8
10/21/24, 8:55 AM
Oklahoma bank fails amid claims of 'false and deceptive bank records' | American Banker
The DIF, which withstood the failure of Silicon Valley Bank and other large regional banks last year, recently stood at $129.2 billion, up $7.5 billion from the end of last year.
That put the pot ahead of schedule — before the most recent failure — to the legally required level of 1.35% by 2026. Some large banks had to make extra payments to cover the losses from the regional banking crisis in 2023.
This is the second bank failure of 2024. Republic First Bank — whose underwater bond troubles mirrored those at First Republic Bank and Silicon Valley Bank — was closed by its state regulator in April. Fulton Bank in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, assumed substantially all of Republic First's $6 billion of assets and $4 billion of deposits.
Claire Williams Reporter, American Banker
For reprint and licensing requests for this article, click here.
POLITICS AND POLICY
FAILURES
BANKING CRISIS 2023
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/oklahoma-bank-fails-amid-claims-of-false-and-deceptive-bank-records?utm_campaign=NL_AB_Daily_Briefing… 4/8
8/22/24, 12:30 PM
Sentencing of Kansas failed-bank CEO delayed
Sentencing of Kansas failed-bank CEO delayed American Banker Online - Powered by Dow Jones · Jim Dobbs US | August 12, 2024 · 12:00am Shan Hanes, the ex-CEO of failed Heartland Tri-State Bank who pleaded guilty earlier this year to stealing millions of dollars from the Elkhart, Kansas-based lender before it failed, will have to wait several more days for his sentence in U.S. District Court. Hanes, 52, admitted on May 23 to embezzling the funds from the $139 million-asset Heartland Tri State and its customers. He was charged in February. Facing up to 30 years in prison, he was originally scheduled for sentencing on Aug. 8. A judge postponed sentencing to Aug. 19, a spokeswoman for prosecutors with the U.S. attorney's office in Wichita, Kansas, told American Banker Monday. A reason for the delay was not immediately available. Prosecutors said that, from May to July 2023, Hanes initiated a series of 10 outgoing wire transfers totaling $47.1 million of Heartland's funds to a cryptocurrency wallet. The money was then transferred to multiple crypto accounts controlled by unidentified third parties. "Even as he was squandering away tens of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency, Hanes orchestrated schemes to cover his tracks concerning the losses at the bank," U.S. Attorney Kate Brubacher said in a statement. Hanes, who could not be reached for comment, admitted in court to embezzling bank funds, causing the bank to fail. Prosecutors said Hanes took money from multiple customer accounts, including one held by a local church.
Prosecutors said Hanes lied to the bank's board, investors and employees about the wire transfers. Federal authorities estimated that shareholders lost between $9.3 million and $13.4 million.
The Kansas Office of the State Bank Commissioner shuttered Heartland Tri-State and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. seized the bank on July 28 of last year. Dream First Bank of Syracuse, Kansas, assumed all of its deposits.
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8/22/24, 12:30 PM
Sentencing of Kansas failed-bank CEO delayed
The FDIC said the agreement caused a $54.2 million hit to its Deposit Insurance Fund.
There were five failures overall last year, including three large regional banks that struggled under the weight of high interest rates and deposit runs. Those downfalls started with Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in March, followed by First Republic Bank in May. Republic First Bank in April marked the lone failure so far this year. It was closed by its state regulator and taken over by the FDIC. The Philadelphia-based bank had struggled to maintain adequate capital and faced proxy challenges from investor groups.
Fulton Bank in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, assumed substantially all of Republic First's $6 billion of assets and $4 billion of deposits, according to the FDIC.
There were no bank failures in 2022 or the year before. But four banks failed in each of 2019 and 2020, according to FDIC data.
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1/29/25, 2:00 PM
Regulators take over Silicon Valley Bank, citing poor 'liquidity and insolvency' | American Banker
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Regulators shut down Silicon Valley Bank, capping abrupt 44-hour collapse
By Polo Rocha , Claire Williams
March 10, 2023, 12:12 p.m. EST 5 Min Read
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulators-take-over-silicon-valley-bank-citing-poor-liquidity-and-insolvency
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1/29/25, 2:00 PM
Regulators take over Silicon Valley Bank, citing poor 'liquidity and insolvency' | American Banker
Regulators shut down Silicon Valley Bank on Friday, capping a remarkable 44-hour fall for the tech heavy bank and sending shock waves through the nancial system.
The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation took possession of the struggling bank, whose stock price tanked 60% the day before, and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as the bank's receiver. It cited inadequate liquidity and insolvency.
The FDIC said it has created the Deposit Insurance National Bank of Santa Clara and transferred all of SVB's insured deposits to that entity. The agency said all insured depositors "will have full access to their insured deposits no later than Monday morning."
The FDIC also said that it "will pay uninsured depositors an advance dividend within the next week." The bank's branches will reopen on Monday, the FDIC said.
Earlier on Friday morning, trading in SVB Financial, the bank's $212 billion-asset parent company, had been paused, and some media reports said the bank was in talks to pursue a sale. The Santa Clara, California-based bank, which on Wednesday announced $1.8 billion in bond-related losses and a plan to raise more capital, was among the 20 largest in the country by assets.
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The FDIC insures depositors' accounts up to $250,000. But many of Silicon Valley Bank's deposits are above that threshold, according to a research note from RBC Capital Markets analyst Gerard Cassidy.
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulators-take-over-silicon-valley-bank-citing-poor-liquidity-and-insolvency
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1/29/25, 2:00 PM
Regulators take over Silicon Valley Bank, citing poor 'liquidity and insolvency' | American Banker
As of the fourth quarter of 2022, deposits that were under $250,000 accounted for just 2.7% of the company's total deposits, Cassidy wrote.
Silicon Valley Bank had received a glut of deposits during the pandemic-era tech boom, when interest rates were still low, and had invested much of that money in low-yielding securities. When interest rates rose sharply, the value of the securities fell, and the bank accumulated unrealized losses on them.
Back in January, SVB Financial CEO Greg Becker suggested that the bank had turned a corner.
"Last quarter, there was more uncertainty," he said during the company's fourth-quarter earnings call . "Even if we're in this prolonged period of time for longer or even a little bit deeper, we know we're going to weather that ne."
But late on Wednesday, the bank said that it had sold $21 billion in securities that were marked as "available for sale" at a $1.8 billion loss, and that it was making downward revisions to its outlook for deposits, net interest income, net interest margin and expenses.
Simultaneously, the bank said it was embarking on a $2.25 billion capital raise. Though it did announce a $500 million commitment from the investment fund General Atlantic, the bank had not secured the full $2.25 billion by the time of its announcement on Wednesday.
Casey Haire, an analyst at Jefferies who covers SVB Financial, said the company made "a colossal mistake" by not raising capital Wednesday.
"They should have raised equity right then and there Wednesday afternoon. They didn't. They had already sold the securities. They waited until the next day and, worse yet, waited until the market opened to have an underwriter call at 10 a.m.," Haire said.
"I'm shocked. This did not have to happen. Had they raised equity on Wednesday night, this never would have happened," he added.
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulators-take-over-silicon-valley-bank-citing-poor-liquidity-and-insolvency
3/9
1/29/25, 2:00 PM
Regulators take over Silicon Valley Bank, citing poor 'liquidity and insolvency' | American Banker
After the bank's announcement on Wednesday, the situation unraveled quickly. On Thursday there were reports that Founders Fund, the venture capital fund co-founded by Peter Thiel, was advising companies to withdraw their money from Silicon Valley Bank.
But between the end of 2021 and Feb. 28, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank's on-balance-sheet deposits had already fallen from around $210 billion to $160 billion, according to Gary Tenner, an analyst at D.A. Davidson.
The bank's decision to sell a large securities portfolio and raise capital put it in a dif cult position, Tenner said Friday.
"Obviously the market was not receptive to their capital raise, to put it lightly," Tenner said.
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SVB shares fall sharply after $1.8B in surprise bond losses
March 9, 2023 3:38 PM
The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank was the rst bank failure in nearly two and a half years. The last FDIC-insured institution to fail was the $70 million-asset Almena State Bank in Kansas on Oct. 23, 2020, according to the FDIC's website ; its estimated cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund was $16.8 million.
Jaret Seiberg, an analyst at TD Cowen, said that Silicon Valley Bank's abrupt collapse stemmed from its unusually large exposure to interest rate risk.
"Silicon Valley had a unique business model that was less dependent on retail deposits than a traditional bank," Seiberg wrote in a note to clients. "This left the bank more exposed to interest rate risk as its funding got more expensive, but its assets were not repricing higher."
The San Francisco Home Loan Bank, which lent $13.5 billion to Silicon Valley Bank in the third quarter of 2022 , is rst in line among creditors.
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulators-take-over-silicon-valley-bank-citing-poor-liquidity-and-insolvency
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1/29/25, 2:00 PM
Regulators take over Silicon Valley Bank, citing poor 'liquidity and insolvency' | American Banker
Seiberg said that it's possible that all depositors will be made whole, since the FDIC said that Silicon Valley Bank's assets exceeded its liabilities by nearly $35 billion on Dec. 31, 2022.
John Popeo, a principal at The Gallatin Group who worked for the FDIC leading bank failure deals during the nancial crisis, predicted that the status of Silicon Valley Bank's unusually high amount of uninsured deposits will now become a subject of contention.
The preferred method of an all-deposits transaction is now off the table, he said, which would have made the process for recovering those uninsured deposits signi cantly easier.
Typically, he said, the kind of transaction that Silicon Valley Bank is undergoing is reserved for situations where there is no prospective acquirer.
"For the uninsured deposits, the depositors will still have the claim against the receiver," Popeo said. "They will have to le a proof of claim with the FDIC's receiver, and the status of what they'll be eligible for is unknown."
Popeo also noted that the timing of the bank's failure — during work hours on a Friday — was unusual.
"That's amazing," he said. "Banks are not supposed to fail until their scheduled closing time. So this speaks to the urgency of the situation."
Allissa Kline and Kevin Wack contributed to this story.
Polo Rocha Staff Writer, American Banker Claire Williams Reporter, American Banker
For reprint and licensing requests for this article, click here .
COMMERCIAL BANKING
BANKING CRISIS 2023
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulators-take-over-silicon-valley-bank-citing-poor-liquidity-and-insolvency
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Problem Bank Training Red Flags
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Objectives of this section:
Define Red Flags
Sources of information used in Red Flag identification
If seen, some questions to ask.
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Definition – Red Flags
• Indicators of actual or potential problems or heightened risk
• Can be indicators of root problems (leading indicators) or symptoms/results (lagging indicators).
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Where do we find red flags?
1. What sources can you use to find red flags?
2. How do you evaluate or decide which red flags to look at?
Type in chat or raise your hand to answer
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Leading or Lagging?
Increase in loan delinquencies
Increase in a particular market concentration Turnover in one or more of executive management
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Whistleblowers – who are they and why do they contact us?
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Former Management or Directors
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Objectives: Definition Sources of red flags
Questions to ask
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Breakout Group Exercise Breakout group exercise (15 minutes) In your group: 1. Select a spokesperson 2. Discuss the red flag 3. Come up with questions (at least 3) you would ask management or areas you want to follow-up on. 4. Your group will present their questions to the larger group.
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Breakout Group Exercise
Groups 1 & 4 :
Groups 2 & 5: •Increase in the level of AOCI (negative) in the bank’s AFS securities.
Groups 3 & 6:
•Increase in borrowings
•Increase in
concentration of depositors in one market sector.
with the FHLB
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List of Red Flags
• Internal reporting delays, errors, omissions • Concentrations, of any kind • Delinquencies • Over 90 and accruing • Weak audit/examination finding remediation tracking • Rapid growth and/or new material product lines • Unfunded commitments • Inaccessible/unresponsive management and/or board • Uninsured deposit levels • Adjusting policy limits simply to avoid exceptions
• Increase in non-core funding
• Decrease in core deposits or no core deposits • Loan renewals without any paydowns
High Net Interest Margin
•
• Loan review scope influenced by management
No audit
•
• Inadequate CECL (ALLL back in the day) methodology • Not reporting policy exceptions to the board
Turnover
•
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In conclusion:
Definitions Sources for red flags Questions to ask
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Questions?
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Examination Plan & Process
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Preparing for Exam
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Exam Scope
Exam scope should be highly detailed.
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Identify a Strategy
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Successful Resolution
ORDER CHAOS
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Organization
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Maintain Documentation
Documentation is key!
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What are some examples in a word or two that were a challenge for you being an EIC in more of a problem situation?
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Gather information
Organized, accurate & complete information.
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Document Management’s Promises
Generally speaking, avoid personal opinions.
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Federal Counterparts
Present a united front with federal counterparts.
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Key Points: • Workpaper procedures • No extra copies • Learn about the bank
• You aren’t alone • CBOs & RBOs
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Communication
Communication is critical to the exam process.
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Reporting
Reporting frequency depends on situation.
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Awareness
Consider regular meetings with examiners.
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Poll: What is your experience with joint exams?
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Communicate with Bank Management
Bank management should not be hearing about Issues for the first time at the exit meeting.
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Written Communication
E-mails should be protected through encryption.
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Confidential Meetings
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Documentation • Include only information about subject bank • Buddy up at meetings • Learn from others & self • Body language & words
• No ultimatums • Keep your cool
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Exam Reports and Enforcement Actions
Prioritize recommendations/areas of weakness.
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Exam Reports and Enforcement Actions
Clearly communicate expectations & timelines.
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Exam Reports and Enforcement Actions
Obtain & document commitments for corrective action.
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Exam Reports and Enforcement Actions
Escalate regulatory action when appropriate.
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Exam Reports and Enforcement Actions
Put in your best effort.
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Exam Reports and Enforcement Actions
Communicate & compromise where you are able.
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Factors Influencing Upgrades and Elimination of Enforcement Actions
Sustainability is key.
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Factors Influencing Upgrades and Elimination of Enforcement Actions
Consider consequences.
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Factors Influencing Upgrades and Elimination of Enforcement Actions
Terminate action after substantial compliance & sustained performance.
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Attendee thoughts….
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Examination Plan & Process Recap
www.menti.com Code: 9611 5751
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Enforcement Actions
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Enforcement Actions
www.menti.com Code: 9819 3563
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What is an enforcement action?
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Why do bank regulators use them?
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Types of Enforcement Actions
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Poll: Which types of Enforcement Actions have you seen?
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Typically Joint Actions
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Contents of an Enforcement Action
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Contents of an Enforcement Action • Identifies parties to the document
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Contents of an Enforcement Action • References a specific examination
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Contents of an Enforcement Action • Requires signatures of directors
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Contents of an Enforcement Action • Sets time frames for initiating change
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Contents of an Enforcement Action • Usually requires reports to regulators
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Informal Actions
Focus on issues of risk/regulatory concern.
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In what areas have you seen management push back?
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Board Resolutions (BR)
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Board Resolutions (BR) • Most informal option • Initiated by regulator • Based on exam findings • Management crafts • Similar to MOU • Not public
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Board Resolutions (BR) • Documented in minutes • Required progress reports
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Board Resolutions (BR) • Understand the problems • Capable of correcting • Possess skill sets needed • Willing to act in a timely manner
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Board Resolutions (BR) • Can be effective • If breached, the foundation for future actions • In place until Board of
Directors rescinds with regulator concurrence
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Poll: Do you think Board Resolutions can be effective?
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Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)
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Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) •Regulators are a party to & craft the document •Developed for banks needing assistance with:
• Weakness identification • Develop corrective action • Set timeframes/prioritize • Reporting progress
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Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)
•Not publicly reported by regulators •Bank disclosure? •Issued to state member and non-member banks
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Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)
•Typically, joint action •Signed by Regulators & Board •Likely prohibit branching & merger activity
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Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) •Challenges with joint documents •Follow-up visits to assess compliance •In place until points addressed,
overall condition is materially better – determined by exam
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Poll: Which do you see more often? Board Resolutions or MOUs?
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Formal Actions
Focus on issues of risk/regulatory concern.
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Written Agreements • Formal/public actions • FRB’s preferred method • OCC often uses • Signed by all parties • FDIC rarely uses
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Written Agreements • Condition more severe or management willingness in question • Lengthier documents • Required audited financial statements disclosure
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Written Agreements • Joint actions • Terminated after compliance • Issued to state member banks, signed by Regulators & Board • Public action
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Consent Orders
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Consent Orders • Used by states & FDIC, sometimes FRB & OCC • Unsafe/unsound practices and/or violations • Reasonable cause • Issued to state member and non-member banks
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Consent Orders • Severe compliance issues • Legal involved in drafting • Legally enforceable • Signed by Regulators & Board
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Consent Orders
• Exams to determine compliance • Statements of fact addressing each point • Requires bank to immediately stop inappropriate action or implement affirmative action
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Consent Order Proceedings
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Consent Order Proceedings
•Agency Issues Notice of Charges and of Hearing • Hearing with ALJ – public & similar to bench trial
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Consent Order Proceedings •Hearing held in 30-60 days •ALJ decision effective after 30 days • US Circuit Court of Appeals •States have similar procedures
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Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) • Capital key part of decisions • Since FDICIA in 1991 • Framework to preserve value to an acquiring institution
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Prompt Corrective Action (PCA)
• Five capital categories • Specific legal ramifications
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New BASEL III Requirements
Total Risk Based Capital
Common Equity Tier 1 RBC Tier 1 RBC
Leverage Ratio
Supplementary Leverage Ratio
%
≥ 10
≥ 8 ≥ 6 < 6 < 4
≥ 6.5 ≥ 4.5 < 4.5
≥ 5 ≥ 4 < 4 < 3
N/A
Well Capitalized
≥ 8 < 8 < 6
≥ 3 < 3
Adequately Capitalized
Undercapitalized
< 3
N/A
Significantly Undercapitalized Critically Undercapitalized
N/A
Tangible Equity (defined as Tier 1 Capital plus non Tier 1 perpetual Preferred stock) to Total Assets ≤ 2
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Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) Capital Categories 1. Well capitalized 2. Adequately capitalized 3. Undercapitalized 4. Significantly undercapitalized 5. Critically undercapitalized
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Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) Capital Categories 1. Well capitalized 2. Adequately capitalized 3. Undercapitalized 4. Significantly undercapitalized 5. Critically undercapitalized
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PCA - Restrictions
•Regardless of PCA category o No dividends o No management fees o No capital distributions if it moves bank to undercapitalized
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Other Enforcement Actions
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Questions
Introduction to Bank Closures
Overview
Overview of an Orderly Bank Closure
Step 1 • Examination results reveal serious problems and viability of the bank is threatened. • The chartering agency (State or OCC) contacts FDIC-DRR and a projected failure date is set.
Overview of an Orderly Bank Closure
Step 2 • DRR obtains a download from the bank and prepares a data room for bidders to conduct due diligence. • Banks that meet certain criteria are invited to bid. • A winning bid is selected based upon the lowest cost to the fund
Overview of an Orderly Bank Closure
Simultaneously, the bank is out looking for a solution, either a capital investor or investors or a merger partner.
• Often called parallel paths
Possible Outcomes 1. FDIC finds a winning bidder, whole bank. With or without loss share.
2. FDIC finds a winning bidder, partial bank. 3. FDIC finds a bank to payout the depositors. 4. FDIC sets up a bridge bank.
Overview of an Orderly Bank Closure
Step 3 – Day of Closure
• On the day of the closure, the licensing agency will go to the bank, serve papers of seizure, and tender the seized bank to the FDIC.
• The FDIC will announce the winning bidder, and the bank will open on Monday under that bank’s name.
Overview of a Fast Failure
• Decline happens so quickly, DRR is not ready. • Usually happens because of liquidity. • Often results in some sort of bridge bank.
Questions?
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Conclusion
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Feedback Survey Please remember to complete the short feedback survey!
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Interested in more learning opportunities?
Calendar of Events
https://www.csbs.org/examiner-learning-roadmaps Learning Roadmaps
www.csbs.org/calendar-events
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Thank you, Instructors!!
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Thank you, attendees!!
Learning Roadmaps
The CSBS Learning Roadmaps are tools to help guide examiners through their learning journey by identifying skill gaps and training opportunities. These tools can also help examiners determine what training is needed to earn formal certification. Available Learning Roadmaps Bank Safety & Soundness Examiners BSA/AML Examiners IT/Cybersecurity Examiners
Developing the Workforce of Tomorrow One of the CSBS strategies is to contribute to innovative learning solutions and develop capabilities that enhance examiner skillsets and promote networked supervision resulting in a high performing, collaborative, and trusted state regulatory workforce.
Money Service Business (MSB) Examiners Mortgage/Non-Depository Examiners Trust Examiners
LearningRoadmaps@csbs.org www.csbs.org/examiner-learning-roadmaps
CSBS Accreditation
CSBS Certification The CSBS Examiner Certification Program recognizes the professionalism and unique skillsets of state regulators and is open to all who meet the education and experience qualifications for a credential. 31 Certification Credentials Safety & Soundness
The CSBS Accreditation Program evaluates state bank, mortgage and money transmitter regulatory agencies against standards set forth by a committee of state regulators. Benefits of Accreditation
Developing the Workforce of Tomorrow One of the CSBS strategies is to contribute to innovative learning solutions and develop capabilities that enhance examiner skillsets and promote networked supervision resulting in a high performing, collaborative, and trusted state regulatory workforce.
Creates Supervision Framework Promotes Process Standardization Builds Trust Improves Information Sharing Keeps States Accountable Recognizes Agencies Performance
Mortgage Licensing Trust IT & Cybersecurity Data Analytics Training
certification@csbs.org csbs.org/examiner-certification
accreditation@csbs.org csbs.org/department-accreditation
Education or training which has been determined to be essential in maintaining and enhancing skills or knowledge necessary for the performance of a job for which the certification is required. Continuing Education Classifications Core Education, training, or other activities which has been determined will enhance skills or knowledge necessary to effectively work as an examiner or regulator including but not limited to soft skills, technical trainings, providing on the-job training, participating on CSBS committees. Training completed as part of employment or general interests but does not directly contribute to the proficiency of the certification maintained. General courses will not count toward continuing education. General Elective
Providing a Path
Certification can assist agencies in developing the workforce of tomorrow by providing a framework for career progression and professional development.
Continuing education to take state regulators to the next level.
Training directors decide what their examiners need Tie in training to certifications Certification as a measure for career progression
Acquiring and maintaining a CSBS Certification gives regulators the opportunity to advance their career along a well-defined career path, encourages knowledge and skills development and recognizes and rewards achievement.
Training Directors will be able to identify courses that align with an examiners credential, maintaining the education and career path provided by their agency in combination with a CSBS certification. Program Improvements
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